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Abstract
An apparently prevailing myth is that safety is undecidable in Discretionary Access Control (DAC);
therefore, one needs to invent new DAC schemes in which safety analysis is decidable. In this paper, we
dispel this myth. We argue that DAC should not be equated with the Harrison-Ruzzo-Ullman scheme,
in which safety is undecidable. We present an efﬁcient (running time cubic in its input size) algorithm
for deciding safety in the Graham-Denning DAC scheme, which subsumes the DAC schemes used in the
literature on comparingDAC with other access controlmodels. We also refute several claims made in recent
work by Solworth and Sloan [26], in which the authors present a new access control scheme based on labels
and relabelling and claim that it can “implement the full range of DAC models”. We present a precise
characterization of their access control scheme and show that it does not adequately capture a simple DAC
scheme.
1 Introduction
Safety analysis, ﬁrst formulated by Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman [11] for the access matrix model [13, 9],
has been recognized as a fundamental problem in access control. Safety analysis decides whether rights can
be leaked to unauthorized principals in future states. Safety analysis was shown to be undecidable in the HRU
scheme. Since then, considerable research effort has gone into designing access control schemes in which safety
analysis is decidable [1, 2, 5, 12, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29]. Safety analysis is particularly interesting
in DAC [6, 7, 9, 10], in which a subject gets rights to resources at the discretion of other subjects. Recently,
there appears to be renewed interest in the topic of safety in DAC, as evidenced by the work by Solworth
and Sloan [26], which was published at the IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy in 2004. In that work,
the authors assert that “in general”, safety is undecidable in DAC, and use this assertion as the motivation for
introducing a new access control scheme based on labels and relabelling that has decidable safety properties.
Our goals in this paper are to present a clear picture of safety in DAC and to refute several erroneous
claims in Solworth and Sloan [26]. The work in Solworth and Sloan [26] is based on the myth that “safety is
undecidable in DAC; therefore, one needs to design new schemes for DAC so that safety analysis is decidable”.
Weconjecture that the basis for thismyth isthat DACissometimes erroneously equated tothe HRUscheme [11]
(for instance, in work such as [17, 21]). As we discuss in Section 3, DAC cannot be equated to HRU for the
following reasons. First, the HRU scheme can be used to encode schemes that are not DAC schemes; therefore,
the fact that safety is undecidable in the HRU scheme should not lead one to conclude that safety is undecidable
in DAC. Second, features in DAC cannot always be encoded in the HRU scheme. For example, some DAC
schemes require that each object be owned by exactly one other subject; thus removal of a subject who has the
ownership of some objects requires the transfer of ownership to some other subject (often times the owner of
the subject being removed) so that this property is maintained. Both the removal of the subject and the transfer
1of ownership of objects it owns occur in a single state-change. A single HRU command cannot capture these
features, because it cannot loop over all objects owned by a subject.
We dispel the myth that safety is undecidable in DAC by presenting an efﬁcient algorithm for deciding
safety in the DAC scheme proposed by Graham and Denning [9]. Our algorithm runs in time cubic in the size
of the input. The Graham-Denning scheme is, to our knowledge, the ﬁrst DAC scheme to have been proposed,
and several other DAC schemes proposed subsequently are either subsumed by or are simple extensions of the
Graham-Denning scheme. Examples of such DAC schemes include those used in Osborn et al. [20] to show
that RBAC can be used to implement DAC. The same schemes were used in Solworth and Sloan [26] to show
that the Solworth-Sloan scheme can implement DAC. Our algorithm suggests that safety in these DAC schemes
can be efﬁciently decided and there is no need to invent new access control schemes.
Some may hold the view that safety can be trivially decided in DAC schemes. For instance, if the owner
of an object is untrusted, then he can grant rights over the object to any other subject. Therefore, if such
an owner exists, then the system will be unsafe for that object. While it may be easy to identify one or two
such conditions that make a DAC system unsafe, identifying all such conditions may not be trivial. To our
knowledge, algorithms for deciding safety in the Graham-Denning or other derived DAC schemes have not
appeared in the literature before. The proof that our algorithm is correct, which is in Appendix A, was not
trivial for us.
We have also developed an algorithm for deciding safety in the DAC scheme developed Grifﬁths and
Wade [10] in the context of database access control. This scheme is the basis for DAC schemes used in most
relational database systems currently in use. Owing to space limitations, we are unable to include a detailed
description and analysis of the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme, but present them separately in a technical report [8].
We summarize our results for the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme in Section 5. We point out that safety analysis is this
scheme is more involved than in the Graham-Denning scheme. Our conclusion is that safety can be decided in
time quartic in the size of the input for the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme.
We also refute several erroneous claims in Solworth and Sloan [26], in which the authors claim:
“We note that ours is the ﬁrst general access control model which both has a decidable safety
property and is able to implement the full range of DAC models.”
We show that the proposed implementation of DAC schemes in the Solworth-Sloan scheme is incorrect. Two
particular limitations that we discuss are the lack of support for removing subjects and objects and the inability
to ensure that an object has only one owner, as required by DAC schemes such as Strict DAC with Change of
Ownership (SDCO), which is a simpliﬁed version of the Graham-Denning scheme.
We observe that the presentation in [26] does not clearly specify what information is maintained in a state,
how states may change, and the precise construction to implement DAC in their scheme. Many details are
scattered in the paper and need to be inferred from descriptions in several places. This makes the understanding
of the scheme and the study of implementation of DAC in this scheme very difﬁcult. In this paper we give a
precise characterization of the Solworth-Sloan scheme and an “implementation” of the SDCOscheme [20] in it.
We observe the “implementation” incurs considerable overhead. Essentially for each new object to be created,
a data structure of the size at least as large as the total number of subjects needs to be created. Furthermore, the
“implementation” is incorrect as it does not preserve the property that every object has only one owner in every
state. We believe that a precise characterization of the Solworth-Sloan scheme is of independent interest. The
publication of two papers [26, 27] based on this scheme in recent major security conferences reﬂects that there
is interest in such a access control scheme based on labels and relabelling.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2 and give precise
deﬁnitions of safety analysis in DAC in Section 3. In Section 4, we study safety analysis in the Graham-
Denning scheme. In Section 5, we brieﬂy summarize our results on safety analysis for the Grifﬁths-Wade
scheme. We analyze the Solworth-Sloan scheme in Section 6 and conclude in Section 7.
22 Related Work
There is considerable work on DAC and safety analysis. To our knowledge, Graham and Denning [9] proposed
the ﬁrst DAC scheme. Their scheme is based on the work by Lampson on the access matrix model [13].
Subsequently, Grifﬁths and Wade proposed their DAC scheme for relational database systems [10]. Downs et
al. [7] discussed salient aspects of DAC, and their work was subsequently subsumed by the NCSC’s guide to
DAC [6]. In her work on issues in access control, Lunt [17] examined various issues in DAC as well. Samarati
and de Capitani di Vimercati [21] included discussions on DAC in their treatment of access control. Osborn
et al. [20] discussed several DAC schemes that are sub-cases or variants of the Graham-Denning scheme in
their comparison of DAC to RBAC. DAC was extended to include temporal constructs by Bertino et al. [3, 4].
Solworth and Sloan [26] presented a new DAC scheme based on labels and relabelling rules. The same scheme
was also used by Solworth and Sloan in [27].
Safety is a fundamental property that was ﬁrst proposed in the context of access control by Harrison et
al. [11]. As we mention in the previous section, subsequently, there has been considerable work on safety in
various contexts related to security [1, 2, 5, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29]. Recent work
by Li et al. [14, 15] perceived various forms of safety as special cases of more general security properties, and
safety analysis is subsumed by security analysis. In this paper, we adopt this perspective in deﬁning safety
analysis in the next section. To our knowledge, the work by Solworth and Sloan [26] is the ﬁrst to directly
address safety in DAC. Other work on safety has been on speciﬁc schemes such as the HRU scheme [11], the
ESPM scheme [1] and a trust management scheme [15]. Furthermore, to our knowledge, there is no prior work
on safety analysis in the context of speciﬁc DAC schemes such as the Graham-Denning scheme [9] and the
Grifﬁths-Wade scheme [10].
3 Deﬁning Safety Analysis in DAC
In this section, we deﬁne access control schemes and systems, and the general problem of security analysis in
the context of such schemes and systems. We then deﬁne safety analysis as a special case of security analysis.
In our deﬁnitions, we adopt the meta-formalism introduced by Li et al. [15, 14].
Deﬁnition 1 (Access Control Schemes and Systems) An access control scheme is a four-tuple  Γ,Ψ,Q,⊢ ,
where Γ is a set of states, Ψ is a set of state-change rules, Q is a set of queries and ⊢: Γ×Q → {true,false} is
the entailment function, that speciﬁes whether a propositional logic formula of queries is true or not in a state.
A state-change rule, ψ ∈ Ψ, determines how the access control system changes state. Given two states γ
and γ1 and a state-change rule ψ, we write γ  →ψ γ1 if the change from γ to γ1 is allowed by ψ, and γ
∗  →ψ γ1
if a sequence of zero or more allowed state changes leads from γ to γ1.
An access control system based on a scheme is a state-transition system speciﬁed by the four-tuple
 γ,ψ,Q,⊢ , where γ ∈ Γ is the start (or current) state, and ψ ∈ Ψ speciﬁes how states may change.
We recognize that our formalism for schemes and systems is fairly abstract. Nonetheless, we need such an
formalism to be able to represent disparate access control schemes, such as those based on the access matrix,
role-based access control and trust management. When we specify a particular access control scheme, we
specify each component precisely, using constructs that are well-understood.
An example of an access control scheme is the HRU scheme [11], in which the state is maintained in an
access matrix. Examples of queries, q1,q2 ∈ Q in the HRU scheme are “q1 = r ∈ M[s,o]” and “q2 = r′ ∈
M[s,o]”. The queries q1 and q2 ask whether the subject s has the right r and r′ over the object o, respectively.
Given a state, γ, and a state-change rule, ψ, in an HRU system, let Sγ be the set of subjects that exist in the
state, γ, Oγ be the set of objects that exist, Mγ[ ] be the access matrix, and Rψ be the set of rights in the system.
Then, γ ⊢ q1 ∧ ¬q2 if and only if s ∈ Sγ ∧ o ∈ Oγ ∧ r ∈ Mγ[s,o] ∧ r′  ∈ Mγ[s,o].
3Deﬁnition 2 (Security Analysis) Given an access control scheme  Γ,Ψ,Q,⊢ , a security analysis instance is
of the form  γ,ψ,￿φ , where φ is a propositional logic formula of queries. Given such an instance, we say that
the instance is true if for all states γ′ such that γ
∗  →ψ γ′, γ′ ⊢ φ. That is, φ represents a security invariant that
must be satisﬁed in all states reachable from γ under ψ for the instance to be true. Otherwise, the instance is
false.
Harrison et al. [11] informally characterize safety as the condition “that a particular system enables one to
keep one’s own objects ‘under control’ ”. This informal characterization seems to be appropriate as a security
property of interest in DAC systems, as the very purpose of DAC is that subjects should be able to keep objects
that they own, under their control. More formally, safety analysis is a special case of the security analysis,
where the invariant is such that an unauthorized subject should not have a particular right to a given object.
Deﬁnition 3 (Safety Analysis) Given an access control scheme  Γ,Ψ,Q,⊢ , let the set of subjects that can
exist in a system based on the scheme be S, let the set of objects be O, and let the set of rights be R. Assume
that there exists a function hasRight: S ×O ×R → {true,false} that returns true if in the current state, s and
o exist, r is a right in the system, and s has the right r over o, and false otherwise. A safety analysis instance
is  γ,ψ,￿¬hasRight(s,o,r)  for some s ∈ S, o ∈ O and r ∈ R. That is, safety analysis is security analysis
with φ instantiated to ¬hasRight(s,o,r). The safety analysis instance is true if hasRight(s,o,r) is false in any
reachable state, and true otherwise.
What is DAC? The NCSC guide titled ‘A Guide To Understanding Discretionary Access Control in Trusted
Systems’ [6], portions of which were published as a research paper [7], states that “the basis for (DAC) is that
an individual user, or program operating on the user’s behalf, is allowed to specify explicitly the types of access
other users (or programs executing on their behalf) may have to information under the user’s control.” We
point out two speciﬁc properties from this characterization of DAC: (1) The notion of “control” – there is a
notion that users exercise control over resources in that a user that controls a resource gets to dictate the sorts
of rights other users have over the resource, and (2) the notion of initiation of an action by a user to change the
protection state – such state changes occur because particular users initiate such changes. A representation of a
DAC scheme needs to capture both these properties.
Some literature (for example, [17, 21]) appears to equate DAC with the HRU scheme [11]. This is incorrect,
as there exist some systems based on the HRUscheme that are not DAC systems. For instance, consider an HRU
system in which there is only one command, and that command has no condition. This system is not a DAC
system as it does not have the ﬁrst property from above on the control of resources by a subject. In addition,
there are DAC schemes that do not have natural representations as HRU schemes. For instance, the Graham-
Denning scheme [9] (see Section 4.1) is a DAC scheme in which a subject may be ‘owned’ or ‘controlled’ by
at most one other subject. An system based on the HRU scheme cannot capture this feature in a natural way.
Trusted subjects in safety analysis In considering the safety property discussed above, each instance of the
analysis is associated with a set T of trusted subjects. The meaning of a trusted subject is that we preclude
state-changes initiated by any subject from T in our analysis. The intuition is that we expect these subjects to
be “well-behaved”. That is, while such subjects may effect state-changes, they do so in such a way that the
state that results from the state-changes they effect is safe. Harrison et al. [11] do consider trusted subjects as
part of their safety analysis. Nonetheless, as pointed out previously by Li et al. [15], the way they deal with
trusted subjects is incorrect. They require that we delete the rows and columns corresponding to trusted subjects
prior to the analysis. While a trusted subject is not allowed to initiate a state-change, she may be used as an
intermediary, and the way Harrison et al. [11] deal with trusted subjects does not consider this possibility. In
this paper, we require only that a member of the set of trusted subjects not initiate a state-change. In all other
ways, these subjects continue to be part of the system.
44 Safety Analysis in the Graham and Denning Scheme
In this section, we study safety analysis in the Graham-Denning DAC scheme [9]. We ﬁrst present a description
of the scheme in the following section. Our description clearly describes the states and state-change rules in the
scheme. In Section 4.2, we present a correct algorithm to decide safety in the scheme. We also assert that the
algorithm is efﬁcient.
4.1 The Graham-Denning Scheme
In this section, We present a precise representation for the Graham-Denning scheme. We deﬁne what data are
stored in a protection state, and how a state-change rule changes a state.
States, Γ We postulate the existence of the following countably inﬁnite sets: O, the set of objects; S, the set
of subjects (S ⊂ O); and R, the set of rights.
Note that the set of objects (or subjects) in any given state is ﬁnite; however, the number of objects that
could be added in some future state is unbounded. Similarly, the set of rights in any given access control system
is ﬁnite; however, different access control systems may use different set of rights. Therefore, we assume S, O,
and R are countably inﬁnite.
We assume a naming convention so that we can determine, in constant time, whether a given object, o, is a
subject (i.e., o ∈ S) or not (i.e., o ∈ O − S). There exists a special “universal subject” U in S; the role of U
will be explained later. The set of rights R contains two special rights own and control, a countably inﬁnite set
Rb of “basic” rights, and a countably inﬁnite set R∗
b of basic rights with the copy ﬂag, i.e., R∗
b = {r∗|r ∈ Rb}.
In other words, R = {own,control} ∪ Rb ∪ R∗
b. The meaning of the copy ﬂag is clariﬁed when we discuss
the state-change rules for the scheme. An access control system based on the Graham-Denning scheme is
associated with a protection state, and a state-change rule.
A state in the Graham-Denning scheme, γ, is associated with the tuple  Oγ,Sγ,Mγ[ ] , where Oγ ⊂ O is
a ﬁnite set of objects that exist in the state γ, Sγ ⊂ S is a ﬁnite set of subjects that exist in γ, and Sγ is a subset
of Oγ. Mγ[ ] is the access matrix, and Mγ[ ]: Sγ × Oγ → 2R. That is, Mγ[s,o] ⊂ R is the ﬁnite set of rights
the subject s ∈ Sγ has over the object o ∈ Oγ.
Every state, γ =  Oγ,Sγ,Mγ[ ] , in the Graham-Denning scheme satisﬁes the following seven properties.
1. Every object must be owned by at least one subject, i.e., ∀o ∈ Oγ ∃s ∈ Sγ(own ∈ Mγ[s,o]).
2. Objects are not controlled, only subjects are, i.e., ∀o ∈ Oγ − Sγ∀s ∈ Sγ(control  ∈ Mγ[s,o]).
3. The special subject U exists in the state, is not owned by any subject, and is not controlled by any other
subject, i.e., U ∈ Sγ ∧ ∀s ∈ Sγ(own  ∈ Mγ[s,U]) ∧ ∀s ∈ Sγ − {U}(control  ∈ Mγ[s,U]).
4. A subject other than U is owned by exactly one other subject, i.e., for every s ∈ Sγ − {U}, there exists
exactly one s′ ∈ Sγ such that own ∈ Mγ[s′,s];
5. Every subject controls itself, i.e., ∀s ∈ Sγ(control ∈ Mγ[s,s]).
6. A subject other than U is controlled by at most one other subject, i.e., for every s ∈ Sγ − {U}, there
exists at most one s′ ∈ Sγ such that s′  = s and control ∈ Mγ[s′,s].
7. There exists no set of subjects such that they form a “cycle” in terms of ownership of each other (and
in particular, a subject does not own itself), i.e., ¬(∃{s1,...,sn} ⊆ Sγ(own ∈ Mγ[s2,s1] ∧ own ∈
Mγ[s3,s2] ∧     ∧ own ∈ Mγ[sn,sn−1] ∧ own ∈ Mγ[s1,sn])).
These state invariants are maintained by the state-change rules.
5State-Change Rules, Ψ Each member, ψ, of the set of state-change rules, Ψ, in the Graham-Denning scheme,
is a set of commands parameterized by a set of rights, Rψ. These commands are shown in Figure 1. Where
possible, we use the syntax for commands from the HRU scheme [11], but as we mention in Section 3, we
cannot represent all aspects of DAC schemes using only constructs from commands in the HRU scheme. We
use some additional well-known constructs such as ∀ and ∃ in these commands. A state-change is the successful
execution of one of the commands. We assume that the state subsequent to the execution of a command is γ′.
We denote such a state-change as γ  →ψ(s) γ′, where s is the initiator of the command. We point out that for
each command, unless speciﬁed otherwise, Sγ′ = Sγ, Oγ′ = Oγ, and Mγ′[s,o] = Mγ[s,o] for every s ∈ Sγ
and o ∈ Oγ. We use ← to denote assignment, i.e., a ← b means that the value in a is replaced with the value
in b. The commands in the Graham-Denning scheme are the following.
• transfer r(i,s,o) This command is used to grant the right r by an initiator that has the right r∗ over o.
There is one such command for every r ∈ Rψ ∩Rb. The initiator, i, must possess the right r∗ over o, and
the subject s must exist for this command execution to succeed.
• transfer r∗(i,s,o) This command is used to grant the right r∗ by an initiator that has the right r∗ over o.
There is one such command for every r∗ ∈ Rψ ∩ R ∗ b∗. The initiator, i, must possess the right r∗ over
o, and the subject s must exist for this command execution to succeed.
• transfer own(i,s,o) This command is used to transfer ownership over o from i to s. For this command
to succeed, i must have the own right over o, s must exist, and the transfer of ownership must not violate
invariant (7) from the list of state invariants we discuss above. After the execution of this command, i
will no longer have the own right over o (but s will).
• grant r(i,s,o) This command is used to grant the right r over o by the owner of o. There is one such
command for every r ∈ Rψ ∩ Rb. For this command execution to succeed, i must have the own right
over o, and s must exist.
• grant r∗(i,s,o) This command is very similar to the previous command, except the the owner grants
r∗ ∈ Rψ ∩ R∗
b.
• grant control(i,s,o) This command is used to grant the control right over o by its owner. For the
execution of this command to succeed, i must have the right control over o, s must exist, o must be a
subject, and another subject must not already have the right control over o. These checks are needed to
maintain the state invariants related to the control right that we discuss above.
• grant own(i,s,o) This command is used to grant the own right over o. This is different from the
transfer own command in that in this case, i retains (joint) ownership over o. For the execution of
this command to succeed, i must have the right own over o, o must not be a subject, and s must exist.
• delete r(i,s,o) This command is used to delete a right a subject has over o. There is one such command
for every r ∈ Rψ ∩Rb. For the execution of this command to succeed, i must have the right own over o,
and s must exist.
• delete r∗(i,s,o) This command is similar to the previous command, except that a right r∗ ∈ Rψ ∩ R∗
b is
deleted.
• create object(i,o) This command is used to create an object that is not a subject. For the execution of
this command to succeed, i must exist, and o must be an object that is not a subject, that does not exist.
An effect of this command is that i gets the own right over o in the new state.
• destroy object(i,o) This command is used to destroy an object that exists. For the execution of this
command to succeed, i must have the right own over o, and o must be an object that is not a subject.
• create subject(i,s) This command is used to create a subject. For the execution of this command to
succeed, i must exist, and s must be a subject that does not exist. In the new state, i has the own right
over s, and s has the control right over itself.
6• destroy subject(i,s) This command is used to destroy a subject. For the execution of this command to
succeed, i must have the own right over s. An effect of this command is that ownership over any object
owned by s is transferred to i.
4.2 Safety analysis
An algorithm to decide whether a system based on the Graham-Denning scheme is safe is shown in Figure 2.
A system based on the Graham-Denning scheme is characterized by a start-state, γ, and state-change rule, ψ
(which is a set of commands). The algorithm takes as input γ, ψ, a triple, ω =  s,o,x  ∈ S × O × R, and a
ﬁnite set, T ⊂ S, of trusted subjects. The algorithm outputs “true” if the system satisﬁes the safety property
with respect to the subject s, object o and right x, and “false” otherwise. We ﬁrst discuss the algorithm, and
then its correctness and time-complexity.
In lines 5-8 of the algorithm, we check the cases for which we do not have to consider potential state-
changes before we are able to decide whether the system is safe or not. In line 7, we check that the right x is
indeed in the system. In line 8, we check whether we are being asked whether s can get the control right over
o, where o is an object that is not a subject (we know s does not have and cannot get the right, by property (2)
of the six properties we discuss in the previous section). In line 9, we check whether the right x has already
been acquired by s over o. In line 10, we check that if the right y has already been acquired by s over o (the
check in line 10 is needed when x ∈ Rb, as then, the possession of x∗ implies the possession of x; in the case
that x ∈ R∗
b, the lines 9 and 10 are identical). When x = own or x = control, the condition of line 10 will
never be true, and we will not return from that line. In the remainder of the algorithm, we consider those cases
in which a state-change is needed before s can get x over o (if it can at all). In line 11, we check whether there
is at least one subject that can initiate state-changes, and if not, we know that the system is safe. In line 12,
we check whether o exists, and if it does not, given that there exists a subject that can create o (from our check
in line 11), the subject can then grant x to s over o. In line 13, we check whether there is a subject that can
initiate state-changes, and that has x with the copy-ﬂag (or x itself, if x ∈ R∗
b). If x = own or x = control, the
condition of line 13 cannot be true. In lines 14-16, we check whether there is a sequence of subjects with the
particular property that each owns the next in the sequence, and the last subject in the sequence owns o. If any
one of those subjects can initiate state-changes, then we conclude that the system is not safe and return false.
In all other cases, we conclude that the system is safe, and return true.
The following lemma asserts that the algorithm is correct. Theorem 2 summarizes our results with respect
to safety analysis in the Graham-Denning scheme.
Lemma 1 A system based on the Graham-Denning scheme, that is characterized by the start-state, γ, and
state-change rule, ψ, is safe with respect to ω =  s,o,x  and T ⊂ S (where T is ﬁnite) if and only if
isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ω,T ) returns true.
Proof. Sketch: the proof is quite lengthy, and we present it in Appendix A. We present a sketch of the proof
here. For the “if” part, we need to show that if the system is not safe with respect to ω and T , then isSafeGD
returns false on input (γ,ψ,ω,T ). If the system is not safe, then we know that there exists a state-change
sequence γ  →ψ(s1) γ1  →ψ(s2)      →ψ(sn) γn, such that x ∈ Mγn[s,o]. If such a sequence exists with n = 0,
then this can only be because s already has the right, and we show that in this case the algorithm returns false.
If n = 1, then the right has to appear in Mγ1[s,o] in only one state-change, and we show that in this case as
well, the algorithm returns false. For the general case, we use induction on n, with n = 1 as the base case.
For the “only if” part, we need to show that if the algorithm returns false, then the system is not safe with
respect to ω and T . We consider each case in which the algorithm returns false (lines 9, 10, 12, 13 and 16). In
each case, we construct a state-change sequence such that in the ﬁnal state of the sequence, γ′, x ∈ Mγ′[s,o].
7command transfer r(i,s,o) command transfer r∗(i,s,o)
if r∗ ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ s ∈ Sγ then if r∗ ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ s ∈ Sγ then
Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] ∪ {r} Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] ∪ {r∗}
command transfer own(i,s,o) command grant r(i,s,o)
if own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ o ∈ Sγ ∧ s ∈ Sγ then if own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ s ∈ Sγ then
if ∄{s1,...,sn} ∈ Sγ such that Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] ∪ {r}
own ∈ Mγ[s1,s] ∧ own ∈ Mγ[s2,s1]
∧     ∧ own ∈ Mγ[sn,sn−1]
∧ own ∈ Mγ[o,sn] then command grant r∗(i,s,o)
Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] ∪ {own} if own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ s ∈ Sγ then
Mγ′[i,o] ← Mγ[i,o] − {own} Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] ∪ {r∗}
command grant control(i,s,o) command grant own(i,s,o)
if own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ o ∈ Sγ ∧ s ∈ Sγ then if own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ o  ∈ Sγ
if ∄ s′ ∈ Sγ such that ∧ s ∈ Sγ then
s′  = o ∧ control ∈ Mγ[s′,o] then Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] ∪ {own}
Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] ∪ {control}
command delete r(i,s,o) command delete r∗(i,s,o)
if (own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ s ∈ Sγ) if (own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ s ∈ Sγ)
∨ control ∈ Mγ[i,s] then ∨ control ∈ Mγ[i,s] then
Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] − {r} Mγ′[s,o] ← Mγ[s,o] − {r∗}
command create object(i,o) command destroy object(i,o)
if o  ∈ Oγ ∧ i ∈ Sγ ∧ o ∈ O − S then if own ∈ Mγ[i,o] ∧ o  ∈ Sγ then
Oγ′ ← Oγ ∪ {o} Oγ′ ← Oγ − {o}
Mγ′[i,o] ← own
command create subject(i,s) command destroy subject(i,s)
if s  ∈ Oγ ∧ i ∈ Sγ ∧ s ∈ S then if own ∈ Mγ[i,s] ∧ s ∈ Sγ then
Oγ′ ← Oγ ∪ {s} ∀ o ∈ Oγ,if own ∈ Mγ[s,o] then
Sγ′ ← Sγ ∪ {s} Mγ′[i,o] ← Mγ[i,o] ∪ {own}
Mγ′[i,s] ← {own} Oγ′ ← Oγ − {s}
Mγ′[s,s] ← {control} Sγ′ ← Sγ − {s}
Figure 1: The set of commands that constitutes the state-change rule, ψ, for a system based on the Graham-
Denning scheme. Each command has a name (e.g., transfer own), and a sequence of parameters. The ﬁrst
parameter is always named i, and is the initiator of the command, i.e., the subject that executes the command.
There is one transfer r, grant r, and delete r command for each r ∈ Rψ ∩ Rb, and one transfer r∗, grant r∗,
and delete r∗ command for each r∗ ∈ Rψ ∩ R∗
b.
81 Subroutine isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ω,T )
2 /* inputs: γ, ψ, ω =  s,o,x , T ⊆ S */
3 /* output: true or false */
4 if x ∈ R∗
b then let y ← x
5 else if x  = own ∧ x  = control then let y ← x∗
6 else let y ← invalid /* No copy flags for own or control */
7 if x  ∈ Rψ then return true
8 if x = control ∧ o ∈ O − S then return true
9 if x ∈ Mγ[s,o] then return false
10 if y ∈ Mγ[s,o] then return false
11 if T ⊇ Sγ then return true
12 if o  ∈ Oγ then return false
13 if ∃b s ∈ Sγ − T such that y ∈ Mγ[b s,o] then return false
14 for each sequence U,sn,...,s2,s1 such that
15 own ∈ Mγ[s1,o] ∧     ∧ own ∈ Mγ[sn,sn−1] ∧ own ∈ Mγ[U,sn] do
16 if ∃si ∈ {s1,...,sn} such that si ∈ Sγ − T then return false
17 return true
Figure 2: The subroutine isSafeGD returns “true” if the system based on the Graham-Denning scheme, char-
acterized by the start-state, γ, and state-change rule, ψ, satisﬁes the safety property with respect to ω and T .
Otherwise, it returns “false”. In line 6, we assign some invalid value to y, as there is not corresponding right
with the copy ﬂag for the rights own and control. In this case, the algorithm will not return in line 10 or 13.
Theorem 2 Safety is efﬁciently decidable in a system based on the Graham-Denning scheme. In particular,
isSafeGD runs in time at worst cubic in the size of the components of the start state and the set of rights in the
system.
Proof. We make the following observations about the running time of isSafeGD in terms of its input, namely,
Sγ,Oγ,Rψ, Mγ[ ], ω and T , by considering each line in the algorithm as follows. Each of the lines 5-10 runs
in time at worst linear in the size of the input. In particular, as we mention in the previous section, we adopt
a naming convention for subjects and objects that enables us to perform the check o ∈ O − S in line 8, in
constant time. Line 11 runs in time at worst quadratic in the size of the input (|Sγ| × |T |), line 12 runs in time
at worst linear (|Oγ|), and line 13 runs in time at worst quadratic (|Sγ| × |Rψ|). As each subject is owned only
by one other subject, each sequence to which line 14 refers is of size at most |Sγ|. Furthermore, there are at
most |Sγ| such sequences. Therefore, lines 14-16 run in time at worst cubic in the size of the input. The fact
that isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ω,T ) runs in time polynomial in the size of the input in conjunction with Lemma 1 proves
our assertion. .
5 The Grifﬁths-Wade Scheme
Grifﬁths and Wade [10] present a DAC scheme for relational database systems. Their scheme is different from
the Graham-Denning scheme in important respects. A key difference is that in the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme, we
have three kinds of objects, base relations, views and rows, and safety analysis must consider all three kinds of
objects. Furthermore, rights over views depend on rights over base relations, and rights over rows depend on
rights over relations and views.
As we mention in Section 1, owing to space limitations, we are unable to include a detailed description
and analysis of the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme. We include these details in [8], and present only the results here.
The algorithm to decide safety in the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme (in [8]) is more involved that the algorithm for
9deciding safety in the Graham-Denning scheme (in Section 4.2), but we adopt a similar strategy in its proof of
correctness.
Theorem 3 Safety is efﬁciently decidable in a system based on the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme. In particular, there
exists an algorithm that returns true if a system based on the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme is safe and false otherwise,
and the algorithm runs in time quartic in the size of the components of the start state.
6 The Solworth-Sloan Scheme, Revisited
Solworth and Sloan [26] present a new DAC scheme based on labels and relabelling rules, and we call it the
Solworth-Sloan scheme. While the presentation in [26] does not clearly specify what information is maintained
in a state and how states may change, we were able to infer what is intended after considerable effort.
In this section, we give a precise characterization of the Solworth-Sloan scheme as a state transition system.
Ourobjective in doing so is torepresent the Solworth-Sloan scheme sufﬁciently precisely to enable comparisons
to other DAC schemes. In particular, our intent is to assess the mapping of DAC schemes to the Solworth-Sloan
scheme that is discussed by Solworth and Sloan [26]. Solworth and Sloan [26] refer to the DAC schemes dis-
cussed by Osborn et al. [20] and assert that “...we present a general access control model which is sufﬁciently
expressive to implement each of these DAC models...” In this section, we show that this claim is incorrect.
We reiterate that the DAC schemes discussed by Osborn et al. [20] are either subsumed by, or are minor
extensions of the Graham-Denning scheme that we discuss in Section 4. We have shown in Section 4.2 that
safety is efﬁciently decidable in the Graham-Denning scheme, and our algorithm can be used with relatively
minor modiﬁcations to decide safety in these schemes. Thereby, Solworth and Sloan’s [26] other assertion in
reference to the DAC schemes discussed by Osborn et al. [20], that “...every published general access control
model...either is insufﬁciently expressive to represent the full range of DACs or has an undecidable safety
problem...”, has been rendered invalid.
6.1 The Solworth-Sloan Scheme
Overview There exists the following countably inﬁnite sets of constants: a set S of subjects, a set O of
objects, a set R of rights, a set G of groups, a set T o of object tags, and a set T g of group tags. An object label
is a pair  s,t , where s ∈ S is a subject and t ∈ T o is a object tag.
Which rights a subject has over a particular object are determined indirectly in the following three steps.
1. There is a labelling function label that assigns an object label to each object.
An object’s label may be changed by object relabelling rules, which determine whether an action rewrit-
ing one object label into another succeeds or not. For example, when the object label ℓ1 =  s1,t1  is
relabelled to ℓ2 =  s2,t2 , all objects that originally have the label ℓ1 now have the label ℓ2.
2. There is an authorization function auth that decides which rights a group has over a particular object
label. For each object label ℓ and each right r, there is one group who has the right r over the label ℓ.
Members of the group have right r over objects that are assigned the label ℓ.
3. Which subjects are members of a group is determined by native group sets (NGS’s), which are compli-
cated structures that we describe below. We deﬁne a function members that maps each group to a set of
subjects.
We schematically illustrate the steps to determine whether a subject can access an object or not as follows.
objects
label −→ object labels
auth −→ groups
members −→ subjects
10States, Γ A state, γ, is characterized by a 9-tuple  Sγ,Oγ,Rγ,Gγ,Lγ,labelγ,authγ,ORSγ,Eγ .
• Sγ is the set of subjects in the state γ; Oγ is the set of objects in the state γ; Rγ is the set of rights in the
state γ, and Gγ is the set of groups in state γ.
There is a distinguished right wr, which exists in every state, i.e., wr ∈ Rγ.
• Lγ ⊂ Sγ × T o is the ﬁnite set of object labels in the state γ.
• labelγ: Oγ −→ Lγ assigns a unique object label to each object in the current state.
• authγ : (Lγ × Rγ) −→ Gγ maps each pair of an object label and a right to a group. For example,
authγ[ℓ,re] = g1 means that the group g1 has the re right over all objects labelled ℓ.
• ORSγ is an ordered sequence of object relabelling rules, each rule has the form of rl(p1,p2) = h, where
rl is a keyword, and p1,p2 are object patterns. An object pattern is a pair, where the ﬁrst element is a
subject in S or one of the three special symbols ∗, ∗u, and ∗w, and the second element is an object tag in
T o or the special symbol ∗. In the rule rl(p1,p2) = h, h is a group, a subject, or one of the four following
sets: {},{∗},{∗u},{∗w}. When h is {∗u} (resp., {∗w}), {∗u} (resp., {∗w}) must appear in p1 or p2.
For example, the following is an RLS, in which s1 is a subject, t1 is an object tag, and g1 is a group:
rl( ∗u,t1 ,  s1,∗ ) = g1
rl( s1,∗ ,  ∗u,t1 ) = {∗}
rl( ∗u,∗ ,  ∗u,∗ ) = {∗u}
rl( ∗u,∗ ,  ∗w,∗ ) = {}
• Eγ is a ﬁnite set of native group sets (NGS’s) that exist in the state, γ. Each e ∈ Eγ is characterized by
the 7-tuple  e.G, e.T g, e.gtag, e.ntg, e.admin, e.patterns, ,e.GRS .
– e.G ⊆ Gγ is the set of groups that are deﬁned in this NGS.
– e.Tg ⊆ T g is the set of group tags that are used in this NGS.
– The function e.gtag : Sγ −→ e.Tg assigns a unique tag to each subject in the current state.
– e.ntg is a group tag in e.T g; it determines when a new subject is added to the state, which tag is
assigned to that subject. That is, if a subject s is added, then e.gtag[s] would be set to e.nt g.
– e.admin points to one NGS in Eγ; it identiﬁes a NGS in the current state as the administrative group
set of the NGS e; e.admin could be e, in which case e is the administrative group set for itself.
– e.patterns is a function mapping each group in e.G to a (possibly empty) set of group patterns.
Each group pattern is a pair where the ﬁrst element is either a subject in the current state or a
special symbol ∗u, and the second element is a group tag in e.T g. In other words, the set of all
group patterns that are can be used in e, denoted by e.P g, is (Sγ ∪ {∗u})× e.T g, and the signature
of e.patterns is e.G −→ 2e.P g
, where 2e.P g
denote the powerset of e.P g.
For any group g ∈ e.G, e.patterns[g] gives a set of patterns for determining memberships of the
group. Intuitively, the label  ∗u,tg  is in e.patterns[g] means that any subject who is assigned (via
the e.gtag function) the group tag tg is amember ofthe group; and the label  s,tg isin e.patterns[g]
means that the subject s is a member of the group if it is assigned the group tag tg.
– e.GRS is a set of group relabelling rules, each has the form Relabel(t
g
1,t
g
2) = g, where Relabel
is a keyword, t
g
1,t
g
2 ∈ e.Tg are two group tags used in this NGS, and g is a group deﬁned in the
administrative group set e.admin (i.e., g ∈ e.admin.G).
11We deﬁne the following auxiliary function e.members[ ] : e.G −→ Sγ such that e.members[g] is the
set of all subjects that are members of the group g. A subject s ∈ e.members[g] if and only if the tag
tg assigned to s (via e.gtag) satisﬁes the condition that at least one of the two group labels  s,tg  and
 ∗u,tg  are in the patterns for g, i.e.,
∃tg ∈ e.Tg ( e.gtag(s) = tg ∧ (  s,tg  ∈ e.patterns[g] ∨  ∗u,tg  ∈ e.patterns[g] ) )
An additional constraint on the state γ is that each group is deﬁned in exactly one NGS and each group
tag can be used in at most one NGS, i.e.,
∀e1 ∈ Eγ∀e2 ∈ Eγ ( e1.G ∩ e2.g = ∅ ∧ e1.Tg ∩ e2.Tg = ∅ )
State-Change Rules, Ψ There is a single state transition rule ψ in this scheme; ψ consists of six actions that
can result in state changes. These actions are mentioned in Section 3.4 of [26] without precise deﬁnition. (We
break up the “Relabel an object” operation in [26] into two relabelling actions.) We describe the actions and
their effects when applying them to a state γ =  Sγ,Oγ,Rγ,Gγ,Lγ,labelγ,authγ,ORSγ,Eγ . We use γ′ to
denote the state after the change.
1. create object(s,o,ℓ =  s1,to
1 ): the subject s creates the object o and assigns the object label ℓ to the
object o.
This action succeeds when s ∈ Sγ, o  ∈ Oγ, ℓ ∈ Lγ and the subject s has the wr right on the object label
ℓ, i.e., s ∈ members[authγ(ℓ,wr)].
Effects of the action are Oγ′ = Oγ ∪ {o} and the function label is extended so that labelγ′(o) =  s1,to
1 .
2. create label(s,ℓ =  s,t1 ,g1,g2,    ,gk), where k = |Rγ| is the number of rights in γ: the subject s
creates the new object label ℓ, and assigns the groups g1,g2,    ,gk to have the rights over ℓ, .
This action succeeds when s ∈ Sγ, ℓ  ∈ Lγ, the subject in ℓ is s, and g1,    ,gk ∈ Gγ.
The effects of this action are follows. Let r1,r2,    ,rk be the k rights in Rγ. Then Lγ′ = Lγ ∪ {ℓ} and
the function auth is extended such that authγ′(ℓ,ri) = gi for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
3. create subject(s,s′): the subject s creates a new subject s′.
This action succeeds when s ∈ Sγ and s′  ∈ Sγ.
The effects of this action are Sγ′ = Sγ ∪ {s′} and for every NGS e ∈ Eγ, e.gtag is extended so that in
γ′, e.gtag(s′) = e.ntg.
4. object relabel(s,ℓ1 =  s1,t1 ,ℓ2 =  s2,t2 ): the subject s relabels objects having label ℓ1 to have the
label ℓ2.
This action succeeds when the ﬁrst relabelling rule in the object relabelling rule sequence ORSγ that
matches (ℓ1,ℓ2) is rl(p1,p2) = h and s ∈ value[h]. The rule rl(p1,p2) = h matches (ℓ1,ℓ2) when p1
matches ℓ1 and p2 matches ℓ2 at the same time. When the pattern  ∗u,∗  matches the label  s1,t1 , we
say that ∗u is uniﬁed with the subject s1. Note that when ∗u occurs more than one times in p1,p2, they
should be uniﬁed with the same subject. Recall that h maybe a group g, a subject s′, or one of the four
sets: {},{∗},{∗u},{∗w}. The function value is deﬁned as follows: value[g] = e.members[g], where e
is the NGS in which g is deﬁned; value[s′] = {s′}; value[{}] = ∅, value[{∗}] = Sγ, value[{∗u}] is the
subject that is uniﬁed with ∗u.
Consider the following RLS.
12rl( ∗u,t1 ,  s1,∗ ) = g1
rl( s1,∗ ,  ∗u,t1 ) = {∗}
rl( ∗u,∗ ,  ∗u,∗ ) = {∗u}
rl( ∗u,∗ ,  ∗w,∗ ) = {}
The action object relabel(s, s2,t1 , s1,t2 ) would match the ﬁrst relabelling rule and succeeds when
s is a member of the group g1. The action object relabel(s, s1,t1 , s2,t2 ) would match the second
relabelling rule and always succeeds. The action object relabel(s, s2,t2 , s2,t1 ) would match the
third relabelling rule and fail, because ∗u is uniﬁed with s2. The action object relabel(s, s2,t2 , s1,t1 )
would match the fourth relabelling rule and fail.
The effect of the relabel action is in the function label. For every object o such that labelγ[o] = ℓ1, in the
new state, labelγ′[o] = ℓ2.
5. group tag relabel(s,s′,t
g
1,t
g
2): the subject s relabels the group tag for the subject s′ from t
g
1 to t
g
2.
This action succeeds when there is an NGS e ∈ Eγ such that t
g
1 and t
g
2 are used in e, the subject s′ has
the group tag t
g
1 in e, there is a corresponding group relabelling rule in e.GRS, and s is a member of the
group that can use the relabelling rule. More precisely, the action succeeds when
∃e ∈ Eγ
￿
e.gtag[s′] = t
g
1 ∧ “Relabel(t
g
1,t
g
2) = g” ∈ e.GRS ∧ s ∈ e.members[g]
￿
Note that the tags t
g
1 and t
g
2 can appear only in one NGS and they must appear in the same NGS for the
action to succeed. The effect of this action is such that the function e.gtag is changed such that in γ′,
e.gtag[s′] = t
g
2.
6. create ngs(s,e): the subject s creates a new NGS e.
To perform this action, one must provide the complete description of a new NGS e, i.e., the 7-tuple
 e.G, e.T g, e.gtag, e.ntg, e.admin, e.patterns, ,e.GRS . For this action to succeed, the groups deﬁned
in e and the group tags in e must be new, i.e., they do not appear in any existing NGS’s in γ.
The effects are that Gγ′ = Gγ ∪ e.G and Eγ′ = Eγ ∪ e.
Given the above state transition rule, we make the following observations. No removal of subjects, objects,
labels, or groups is deﬁned. Given a state  Sγ,Oγ,Rγ,Gγ,Lγ,labelγ,authγ,ORSγ,Eγ , Sγ (the set of sub-
jects), Oγ (the set of objects), and Gγ (the set ofgroups) maychange asaresult of create subject,create object,
and create label, respectively. Rγ, the set of rights, is ﬁxed for the system and does not change. Gγ, the set of
groups, may change when a new NGS is added by the create ngs action. The function labelγ: Oγ −→ Lγ is
extended when a new object is added and is changed when an object relabelling action object relabel happens.
The function authγ is extended when a new object label is created; existing assignments do not change. ORSγ,
the object relabelling rule sequence, always stay the same. Eγ is extended when a new NGS is added.
6.2 Encoding a simple DAC scheme in the Solworth-Sloan scheme
In this section, we encode a relatively simple DAC scheme in the Solworth-Sloan scheme. The DAC scheme we
consider is a sub-scheme of the Graham-Denning scheme. It is called Strict DAC with Change of Ownership
(SDCO)and is one of the DAC schemes discussed by Osborn et al. [20]. Our construction is based on comments
by Solworth and Sloan [26] on how various DAC schemes can be encoded in the Solworth-Sloan scheme. As
the presentation in that paper is not detailed, we offer a more detailed construction. Our constructions lets us
assess the utility of the Solworth-Sloan scheme in encoding SDCO. After we present our encoding, we discuss
the overhead introduced by mapping SDCO to the Solworth-Sloan scheme and the correctness of this mapping.
13Strict DAC with Change of Ownership (SDCO) As we mention above, SDCO is a sub-scheme of the
Graham-Denning scheme (see Section 4.1). In SDCO, there is a distinguished right, own, but no control right.
Also, there are no rights with the copy ﬂag. The state-change rules in SDCO are the commands grant r (for
each r ∈ Rψ), delete r (for each r ∈ Rψ), grant own, create object and create subject. We do not consider
commands to destroy subjects or objects as their counterparts are not speciﬁed for the Solworth-Sloan scheme.
For simplicity, we consider an SDCO scheme that has only three rights own,re,wr. In the Solworth-Sloan
scheme, if two objects o1 and o2 have the same label, then o1 and o2 always have the same access characteristics.
Thatis, in every state, the setof subjects having a right r over o1 isthe sameas the setof subjects having theright
r over o2. In SDCO, one can reach states in which o1 and o2 have different access characteristics. Therefore,
each object needs to be assigned a distinct label, we use  s,t(o)  to denote such an label.
Therefore, before creating an object, one has to create a new label. When creating a new label ℓ, one
has to assign a group to auth(ℓ,own) and a group to auth(ℓ,re); and a group to auth(ℓ,wr). Each pair  ℓ,r 
determines a unique access class. Therefore, a distinct group needs to be created. We use g(o,r) to denote the
group that will be assigned to have the right r over object o.
In order to keep track of which subset of rights a subject has over an object, we need 8 group tags, one
corresponding to each subset of {own,re,wr}, we use tg(o,x), where x is a 3-bit string to denote these tags.
In order for a subject s to create an object o, s needs to do the following:
1. Create an NGS e =  e.G, e.T g, e.gtag, e.ntg, e.admin, e.patterns, ,e.GRS  as follows.
• e.G = {g(o,own),g(o,re),g(o,wr)}
• e.Tg = {tg(o,000),tg(o,001),tg(o,010),tg(o,011),tg(o,100),tg(o,101),tg(o,110),tg(o,111)}.
• e.gtag[s] = tg(o,100) and e.gtag[s′] = tg(o,000) for every s′ ∈ Sγ s.t. s′  = s.
• e.ntg = tg(o,000)
• e.admin = e
• e.patterns[g(o,own)] = { ∗u,tg(o,100) , ∗u,tg(o,101) , ∗u,tg(o,110) , ∗u,tg(o,111) }
e.patterns[g(o,re)] = { ∗u,tg(o,010) , ∗u,tg(o,011) , ∗u,tg(o,110) , ∗u,tg(o,111) }
e.patterns[g(o,wr)] = { ∗u,tg(o,001) , ∗u,tg(o,011) , ∗u,tg(o,101) , ∗u,tg(o,111) }
• e.GRS = {Relabel(g(o,b1b2b3),g(o,b′
1b′
2b′
3)) = g(o,own)
| b1b2b3,b′
1b′
2b′
3 ∈ {0,1}3 ∧ b1b2b3 and b′
1b′
2b′
3 differ in exactly one bit
￿
2. Use the action create label(s, s,t(o) ,g(o,re),g(o,wr)) to create the label ℓ(o).
3. Use the action create object(s,o, s,t(o) ) to create the object o and label it with ℓ(o).
To grant or revoke a right, one uses group relabelling. For instance, suppose s is a subject, and for the NGS,
e, e.gtag[s] = tg(o,000). Then, we know that s is not a member of any of the groups g(o,own), g(o,re) or
g(o,wr). The subject would be granted the right re by relabelling  s,tg(o,000)  to the label  s,tg(o,010) . The
execution of this relabelling results in the subject becoming a member of the group g(o,re), thereby giving him
the right re over the object o. Similarly, the subject would have the right re revoked by relabelling  s,tg(o,010) 
to the label  s,tg(o,000) . These operations can be carried out only by a subject that is a member of the group
g(o,own).
We make the following observations about the above mapping.
• There is considerable overhead in implementing a relatively simple DAC scheme (SDCO) in the
Solworth-Sloan scheme. For each object, we need to create a set of labels whose size is linear in the
number of the subjects in the state. We also need to create a set of tags whose size is exponential in
14the number rights in the system. These tags are used to deﬁne groups, and the therefore, the number of
entries in all the sets of patterns is also exponential in the number of rights in the system. This is con-
siderable overhead considering the simplicity of SDCO, and the fact that we can “directly” implement it,
with efﬁciently decidable safety.
• We are unable to capture destruction of subjects and objects as such constructs have not been speciﬁed
for the Solworth-Sloan scheme. Destruction of subjects and objects is generally considered to be an
important component ofanyaccess control system. Inparticular, itisunclear how andwithwhat overhead
we can capture in the Solworth-Sloan scheme, the notion of transfer of ownership over objects owned by
a subject that is being destroyed.
• The above mapping does not capture the state invariant in SDCO that in every state, there is exactly one
owner for every object that exists. In the Solworth-Sloan system that results from the above mapping,
one can perform relabelling operations and reach states in which there are mutiple owners for an object,
or no owner for an object. For instance, suppose that there already exists a subject s such that s ∈
e.members[g(o,own)]. Given the above relabelling rules, there is nothing that precludes another subject
from also becoming a member of the group g(o,own) while s continues to maintain membership in that
group. It is also possible to remove the membership of s in the group g(o,own) thereby leaving the object
with no owner. It is unclear how we would prevent such situations from occuring in a system based on
the Solworth-Sloan scheme.
Our conclusion is that several of the claims made by Solworth and Sloan [26] are incorrect. In particular,
not only is the motivation (decidable safety) for the creation of their new scheme invalid, but it is also not
effective in implementing relatively simple DAC schemes.
7 Conclusions
The focus of this paper is to provide a clear picture of safety analysis in DAC. We have used a state-transition-
system-based meta-formalism to precisely model access control schemes and systems and have studied safety
analysis in two general DAC schemes from the literature, the Graham-Denning scheme [9], and the Grifﬁths-
Wade scheme [10]. For the Graham-Denning scheme, we have presented an algorithm for deciding safety with
running time O(n3) and proved that the algorithm is correct. Because of space limitations, we were unable
to include details of our analysis of the Grifﬁths-Wade scheme, but we have summarized that there exists an
O(n4) algorithm for deciding safety in the scheme. We have also refuted several claims made by Solworth and
Sloan [26]. In particular, we have refuted the claim that the mapping presented there encodes all DAC schemes
by considering a relatively simple DAC scheme and demonstrating that the mapping has several deﬁciencies.
We conclude by asserting that safety in existing general DAC schemes is decidable and there is no need to
invent new DAC schemes with decidable safety as the goal.
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A Proof for Lemma 1
Proof. The “if” part: we need to show that if isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ω,T ) returns true, then the system is safe with
respect to ω and T . We show, equivalently, that if the system is not safe with respect to ω and T , then
isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ω,T ) returns false. Assume that the system is not safe with respect to ω and T . We have
two cases. The ﬁrst case is that in the start-state, γ, s has x over o. This case consists of two subcases: either
(1) x ∈ Mγ[s,o], or (2) x ∈ Rb and x∗ ∈ Mγ[s,o] (possession of x∗ implies possession of x). If both (1) and
(2) are true, we consider either one of those two subcases. If subcase (1) is true, then we know that x ∈ Rψ,
and if x = control and o ∈ O − S, then x  ∈ Mγ[s,o] (by property (2) from the previous section that objects
that are not subjects cannot have the control right over them). Therefore, the ‘if’ conditions of lines 7 and 8 are
not satisﬁed, and line 9 of the algorithm returns false, and we are done. For subcase (2), in line 5 we instantiate
y to x∗. We know that x,y ∈ Rψ, and that x  = control. Therefore, the ‘if’ conditions for lines 7 and 8 are not
17satisﬁed. The ‘if’ condition for line 9 may be satisﬁed and if it is, the algorithm returns false and we are done.
Otherwise, the algorithm returns false in line 10.
The second case is that s does not have x over o in the start-state, i.e., x  ∈ Mγ[s,o] and if x ∈ Rb,
then x∗  ∈ Mγ[s,o]. In this case, as the system is not safe, there exists a ﬁnite sequence of state-changes
γ  →ψ(s1) γ1  →ψ(s2)      →ψ(sn) γn where n is an integer and n ≥ 1, such that either x ∈ Mγn[s,o], or if
x ∈ Rb, then x∗ ∈ Mγn[s,o]. Each si ∈ Sγi−1 − T and the si’s are not necessarily distinct from one another.
We point out also that if si ∈ Sγj − T for some i and j, and si ∈ Sγk for some k  = j, then si ∈ Sγk − T ,
because T is speciﬁed a-priori and does not change with changes in the state. We now show that if such a
sequence of state-changes exists, then the algorithm returns false. We show this by induction on n. For the base
case, if there exists a sequence of length 1, then γ  →ψ(s1) γ1, and x  ∈ Mγ[s,o] and x∗  ∈ Mγ[s,o] if x ∈ Rb,
and x ∈ Mγ1[s,o], or x ∈ Rb and x∗ ∈ Mγ1[s,o]. In this case, the state-change is the execution of one of the
following commands, and we show that the algorithm returns false in each case. The state-change has to be the
execution of one of these commands because these are the only commands that enter a right in to a cell of the
access matrix.
transfer r – in this case we know that x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ, x∗ ∈ Rψ, x∗ ∈ Mγ[s1,o] for some s1 ∈ Sγ − T , and
s ∈ Sγ. The algorithm will not return in any of the lines 7-11 as the respective ‘if’ conditions are not
satisﬁed. If o  ∈ Oγ, then the algorithm returns false in line 12, and we are done. If o ∈ Oγ, then the
conditions for line 13 are met (y is instantiated to x∗), and the algorithm returns false.
transfer r∗ – we have two subcases to consider: either (1) x ∈ R∗
b ∩Rψ, or, (2) x ∈ Rb∩Rψ. In case (2), let y
be x∗, and in case (1), let y be x. We know in either case that y ∈ Mγ[s1,o] for some s1 ∈ Sγ − T , and
s ∈ Sγ (otherwise s would not get the right x over o after the execution of the command). The algorithm
will not return in any of the lines 7-11 as the respective ‘if’ conditions are not satisﬁed. If o  ∈ Oγ, then
the algorithm returns false in line 12, and we are done. If o ∈ Oγ, then the conditions for line 13 are met
and the algorithm returns false.
transfer own – in this case we know that x = own, own ∈ Mγ[i,o] for some i ∈ Sγ − T , o ∈ Sγ and
s ∈ Sγ. The ‘if’ conditions for each of lines 7-13 are not met (for line 11, we know that own∗  ∈ Rψ).
Consider lines 14-16. We know that such a sequence of subjects exists (as i has the own right over o in
Sγ), and furthermore, i ∈ Sγ − T . Therefore, the conditions to return false in lines 14-16 are met, and
the algorithm returns false.
grant r – in this case, we know that own ∈ Mγ[i,o] for some i ∈ Sγ − T and x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ (in particular,
x  = control and x  = own – there are other commands to grant those rights). The ‘if’ conditions for
each of lines 7-11 are not met. If o  ∈ Oγ, the algorithm returns false in line 12, and we are done. If
o ∈ Oγ, the conditions for line 13 may be met, and if they are, the algorithm returns false and we are
done. If the conditions in line 13 are not met, then we observe that the conditions for lines 14-16 are met
(the sequence of subjects contains i, as i has the own right over o in Sγ), and the algorithm returns false.
grant r∗ – we have two subcases to consider. Either (1) x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ, or, (2) x ∈ R∗
b ∩ Rψ. For case (1), let
y be x∗ and for case (2), let y be x. In either case, we know that own ∈ Mγ[i,o] for some i ∈ Sγ − T .
The ‘if’ conditions for lines 7-11 are not met. If o  ∈ Oγ, then the algorithm returns false in line 12, and
we are done. Otherwise, the conditions for line 13 may be met, and if they are, the algorithm returns
false, and we are done. Otherwise, we observe that the conditions for lines 14-16 are met (the sequence
of subjects contains i, as i has the own right over o in Sγ), and the algorithm returns false.
grant control – in this case, we know that x = control, own ∈ Mγ[i,o] for some i ∈ Sγ − T and o ∈ Sγ.
Therefore, the ‘if’ conditions for lines 7-12 are not met. The ‘if’ conditions for line 13 are not met
because we know that y  ∈ Rψ. But, we observe that the conditions for lines 14-16 are met, because the
18subject i that is not trusted exists in γ, and i has the own right over o. Therefore, the algorithm returns
false in line 16.
grant own – in this case, we know that x = own and own ∈ Mγ[i,o] for some i ∈ Sγ−T . The ‘if’ conditions
for lines 7-11 are not satisﬁed. If o  ∈ Oγ, then the algorithm returns false in line 12 and we are done.
Otherwise, the condition in line 13 is not satisﬁed, but, we observe that the conditions for lines 14-16 are
satisﬁed, and the algorithm returns false.
create object – in this case, we know that x = own and o  ∈ Oγ. The ‘if’ conditions for lines 7-11 are not met,
but the ‘if’ condition for line 12 is met, and the algorithm returns false.
create subject – in this case, we know that ∃i ∈ Sγ − T , and either x = own or x = control. Furthermore,
we know that o  ∈ Oγ. The reason is that in the body of the command, we enter a right only in the column
corresponding to the subject that is created in the execution of the command, and not any other object.
Therefore, for ω =  s,o,x , we know that o must be the subject that is created in the execution of the
create subject command. We know also that o  ∈ O − S, because the object that is created is a subject.
Therefore, the respective ‘if’ conditions for lines 7-11 are not satisﬁed, but the ‘if’ condition for line 12
is satisﬁed, and the algorithm returns false.
destroy subject – in this case, we know that x = own, and own ∈ Mγ[s,s′], where ω =  s,o,x  and s′ is
the subject that is destroyed in the execution of the command. The reason is that we enter a right only
in the row corresponding to such a subject s. Furthermore, we know that o ∈ Oγ and own ∈ Mγ[s′,o],
because the only columns in which a right is entered in the execution of the command are columns with
that property. We know also that s ∈ Sγ − T as s is the initiator of the command-execution. Given
these facts, we know that the ‘if’ conditions for lines 7-12 are not satisﬁed. The conditions for line 13
may be met, and if they are, the algorithm returns false and we are done. Otherwise, we observe that the
conditions for lines 14-16 are satisﬁed; the sequence of subjects contains s and s′ with s′ being the last
member of the sequence, and s immediately preceding s′ in the sequence. As s ∈ Sγ − T , the algorithm
returns false in line 16.
For the induction hypothesis, we assume that if there exists a state-change sequence γ  →ψ(s1) γ1  →ψ(s2)
     →ψ(sk−1) γk−1 of length k − 1 (for k − 1 ≥ 1) such that x  ∈ Mγ[s,o] and if x ∈ Rb, x∗  ∈ Mγ[s,o], and
either x ∈ Mγk−1[s,o] or, if x ∈ Rb, x∗ ∈ Mγk−1[s,o], then the algorithm returns false. Now assume that there
exists a state-change sequence γ  →ψ(s1)      →ψ(sk) γk of length k (for k ≥ 2) such that x  ∈ Mγ[s,o] and if
x ∈ Rb, x∗  ∈ Mγ[s,o], and either x ∈ Mγk[s,o] or, if x ∈ Rb, x∗ ∈ Mγk[s,o]. We need to show that the
algorithm returns false for ω =  s,o,x .
We have two cases. The ﬁrst case has two subcases: either (a) x ∈ Mγk−1[s,o], or, (b) x ∈ Rb and
x∗ ∈ Mγk−1[s,o]. In either case, we have a state-change sequence of length k − 1 with the appropriate
properties, and by the induction hypothesis, we know that the algorithm returns false. In the second case, we
assume that x  ∈ Mγk−1[s,o] and if x ∈ Rb, x∗  ∈ Mγk−1[s,o], and either x ∈ Mγk[s,o] or x ∈ Rb and
x∗ ∈ Mγk[s,o]. We need to show that the algorithm returns false in this case. We consider the state-change
γk−1  →ψ(sk) γk. It must be the execution of one of the following commands (the same as those we considered
for the base case), as those are the only commands that add a right to a cell in the access matrix. We consider
each in turn. We point out that as k ≥ 2, we have at least 3 states in our state-change sequence, including the
start-state, i.e., we know that at least the states γk−2,γk−1 and γk (where the start-state, γ = γ0) exist in the
state-change sequence.
transfer r – in this case, we know that x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ and x∗ ∈ Mγk−1[sk,o]. Let ωk =  sk,o,x∗ . Then, we
know by the induction hypothesis that isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ωk,T ) returns false (as there exists a state-change
sequence of length k − 1 with the appropriate properties). We refer to the execution of the algorithm for
the input (γ,ω,T ) as e, and for the input (γ,ωk,T ) as ek. Consider the following cases.
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(because x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ). e may return false in line 9 or line 10, in which case we are done. If not,
e will not return in lines 11-12 as sk ∈ Sγ − T and o ∈ Oγ. Finally, e will return false in line 13,
because sk ∈ Sγ − T , and y ∈ Mγ[sk,o].
• ek returns in line 10: this cannot happen as, in this case, ek would have returned in line 9. Therefore,
the arguments for the previous case apply.
• ek returns in line 12: in this case, e will not return in any of the lines 7-11, but will return false in
line 12.
• ek returns in line 13: in this case, we know that ∃ b s ∈ Sγ −T such that y ∈ Mγ[b s,o] where y = x∗.
e will not return in lines 7-8, but may return false in one of the lines 9 or 10, in which case we are
done. Otherwise, e will not return in line 11 (as b S exists in γ) or in line 12 (o ∈ Oγ). But, e will
return false in line 13, as the condition is met (b S is such a subject).
• ek returns in line 16: in this case, e will not return in lines 7-8 but may return in line 9, in which
case we are done. Otherwise, e will not return in lines 10-13. We know that e will return false in
line 16, just as ek does, because the same condition is true for e as well.
transfer r∗ – in this case, we know that x ∈ R∗
b ∩ Rψ, and x ∈ Mγk−1[sk,o] where sk ∈ Sγk−1 − T . Let
ωk =  sk,o,x , ek be the execution of the algorithm isSafeGD for the input (γ,ψ,ωk,T ), and e be the
execution for the input (γ,ω,T ). Then we know that ek returns false by the induction hypothesis. We
now have exactly the same arguments as in the previous case for why e returns false.
transfer own – in this case we know that x = own and own ∈ Mγk−1[sk,o] where sk ∈ Sγk−1 − T . For
ωk =  sk,o,own , we know that, ek, the execution of the algorithm on input (γ,ωk,T ), returns false,
by the induction hypothesis. We consider all the cases in which ek can return false.
• ek returns in line 9: in this case, we know that own ∈ Mγ[sk,o] and sk ∈ Sγ −T . Now, e does not
return in any of the lines 7-8. e may return in line 9, in which case we are done. e cannot return in
line 10 (as y  ∈ Rψ), or in line 11, but may return in line 12, in which case we are done. e cannot
return in line 13. Finally, we observe that the conditions in lines 14-16 are satisﬁed, and therefore,
e returns in line 16.
• ek returns in line 10: this cannot happen because when x = own, y  ∈ Rψ.
• ek returns in line 12: in this case, we know that e does not return in lines 7-11, but returns false in
line 12.
• ek returns in line 13: this cannot happen because when x = own, y  ∈ Rψ.
• ek returns in line 16: in this case, e does not return in lines 7-8, but may return in line 9, in which
case we are done. Otherwise, e cannot return in lines 10-13, but returns false in line 16 based on
the same conditions that ek satisﬁes to return in line 16.
grant r – in this case, we know that x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ and own ∈ Mγk−1[sk,o], where sk ∈ Sγk−1 − T . We know
also that ek, the execution of the algorithm, on input (γ,ωk,T ) returns false, where ωk tuplesk,o,own.
Let e be the execution of the algorithm for the input (γ,ω,T ). We have the following cases.
• ek returns in line 9: in this case, we know also that own ∈ Mγ[sk,o] where sk ∈ Sγ−T . Therefore,
e does not return in lines 7-8, but may return false in either line 9 or line 10, in which case we are
done. Otherwise, e does not return in lines 11-12, but may return false in line 13, in which case
we are done. Finally, e returns false in line 16, because the conditions for returning in line 16 are
satisﬁed (sk is such a subject).
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• ek returns in line 12: in this case, e does not return in lines 7-11, but returns false in line 12.
• ek returns in line 13: this is not possible as when x = own, y  ∈ Rψ.
• ek returns in line 16: in this case, we know that e does not return in lines 7-8, but may return in one
of the lines 9-10, in which case we are done. Otherwise, e does not return in lines 11-12, but may
return in line 13, in which case we are done. Finally, e returns in line 16 as the conditions for which
ek returns in line 16 apply to e as well.
grant r∗ – in this case, we know that x ∈ R∗
b ∩ Rψ and own ∈ Mγ[sk,o] for sk ∈ Sγk−1 − T . The argument
now proceeds exactly as for the previous case, and we are able to show that isSafeGDreturns false on the
input (γ,ψ,ω,T ).
grant control – in this case, we know that x = control and own ∈ Mγk−1[sk,o] for sk ∈ Sγk−1 − T . Let
ωk =  sk,o,own , and ek be the execution of the algorithm on the input (γ,ωk,T ). We know, by the
induction hypothesis, that ek returns false. Let e be the execution of the algorithm on the input (γ,ω,T ).
We have the following cases.
• ek returns in line 9: in this case we know also that own ∈ Mγ[sk,o] and sk ∈ Sγ −T . Therefore, e
does not return in lines 7-8 (for line 8, we know that o  ∈ O−S, as otherwise, we would not be able
to grant the control right to s over o in the ﬁnal state-change in our sequence), and e may return
false in line 9, in which case we are done. Otherwise, e does not return in lines 10-13 (for lines 10
and 13, y  ∈ Rψ). Finally, e returns false in line 16 because we know that sk, a subject that is not
trusted, exists in γ, and has the own right over o.
• ek returns in line 10: this is not possible as when x = own, y  ∈ Rψ.
• ek returns in line 12: in this case, e does not return in lines 7-11, but returns false in line 12.
• ek returns in line 13: this is not possible as when x = own, y  ∈ Rψ.
• ek returns in line 16: in this case, e does not return in lines 7-8, but may return in lines 9-10, in
which case we are done. Otherwise, e does not return in lines 11-12, but may return in line 13, in
which case we are done. Finally, e returns in line 16 as the conditions for which ek returns in line
16 apply to e as well.
grant own – in this case, we know that x = own and own ∈ Mγk−1[sk,o] for sk ∈ Sγk−1 − T . We show that
the execution of the algorithm on input (γ,ω,T ) returns false using the same arguments as the ones we
use for the previous case.
create object – in this case, we know that x = own, s = sk and sk ∈ Sγk−1 − T . We consider the following
cases (and sub-cases).
• s ∈ Sγk−2: in this case we need to consider the following two sub-cases.
– o ∈ Oγk−2: in this case, we know that the state-change γk−2  →ψ(sk−1) γk−1 is destroy object
of object o by sk−1. Therefore, we know that own ∈ Mγk−2[sk−1,o] and sk−1 ∈ Sγk−2 − T .
If s = sk−1, then we have a state-change sequence of length k − 2 with the appropriate
properties, and we know that the algorithm returns false. Otherwise, we have a state-change
γk−2  →ψ(sk−1) γ′
k−1 which is the execution of either the command transfer own (if o ∈ S), or
the command grant own (if o ∈ O−S), by sk−1 to s, which results in own ∈ Mγ′
k−1[s,o]. As
there exists a state-change sequence of length k − 1, we know that the algorithm returns false
by the induction hypothesis.
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k−1 which is the execution of
the command create object of o by s, which results in own ∈ Mγ′
k−1[s,o]. As there exists a
state-change sequence of length k−1, weknow that the algorithm returns false by the induction
hypothesis.
• s  ∈ Sγk−2: in this case, we know that the state-change γk−2  →ψ(sk−1) γk−1 is the execution of
create subject to create s. Also, we know that o  ∈ Oγk−2. If γk−2 = γ, then we know that, on
input (γ,ω,T ), the algorithm will not return in lines 7-11, but will return false in line 12, and we
would be done in this case. Otherwise, there exists at least one prior state, γk−3 in the sequence of
state-changes. We have the following sub-cases.
– s ∈ Sγk−3, but o  ∈ Oγk−3: in this case, we know that the state-change γk−3  →ψ(sk−2) γk−2
is the execution of destroy subject of s by sk−2. Consider the alternate state-changes
γk−3  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−2  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−1, where the ﬁrst state-change is the execution of
create object of o by sk−2, and the second is the execution of transfer own (if o ∈ S) or
grant own (if o ∈ O − S) of the object o by sk−2 to s. We have a desired state-change
sequence of length k − 1, and the algorithm returns false by the induction hypothesis.
– s  ∈ Sγk−3, but o ∈ Oγk−3: in this case, we know that the state-change γk−3  →ψ(sk−2)
γk−2 is the execution of destroy object of o by sk−2. Consider instead the state-changes
γk−3  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−2  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−1, where the ﬁrst state-change is the execution of
create subject of s by sk−2 and the second is the execution of transfer own (if o ∈ S) or
grant own (if o ∈ O − S) of the object o to s by sk−2. We have the desired state-change
sequence of length k − 1, and the algorithm returns false by the induction hypothesis.
– s  ∈ Sγk−3, and o  ∈ Oγk−3: we know that s  ∈ T (otherwise s would not be able to execute
create object as the last state-change in our state-change sequence of length k). We know also
that sk−2 ∈ Sγk−3 − T . Consider the following state-changes: γk−3  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−2  →ψ(ψ(s)
γ′
k−1 where the ﬁrst state-change is the execution of create subject of s by sk−2 and the second
is the execution of create object of o by s. Wehave the desired state-change sequence of length
k − 1, and the algorithm return false.
– s ∈ Sγk−3, and o ∈ Oγk−3: this case cannot happen, as then, we would need to ﬁrst destroy
each of s and o, which requires two state-changes (we know that s  = o, because otherwise, s
would not be able to create o in the last state-change in our sequence of length k). We have
already ﬁxed two additional state-changes (create subject of s, and create object of o as our
last two steps in our state-change sequence of length k). Asthere do not exist four state changes
between γk−3 and γk, we know that this case cannot happen.
create subject – in this case, we know that o ∈ Sγk, and either s = o (and x = control), or s = sk (and
x = own). We know also that o  ∈ Sγk−1. We have the following cases.
• s = o: we have the following sub-cases.
– o ∈ Sγk−2: in this case, we know that s = o ∈ Sγk−2 and control ∈ Mγk−2[s,o], and therefore
we have a state-change sequence of length k −2 with the appropriate properties, and therefore
by the induction hypothesis, the algorithm returns false.
– o  ∈ Sγk−2: in this case, consider the state-change γk−2  →ψ(sk−1) γ′
k−1 which is the execu-
tion of create subject of o = s by sk−2 (we know that sk−2 ∈ Sγk−2 − T ). We have the
desired state-change sequence of length k − 1 and the algorithm returns false by the induction
hypothesis.
• s = sk: we have the following sub-cases.
22– o ∈ Sγk−2: in this case, we know that the state-change γk−2  →ψ(sk−2) γk−1 is the execution
of destroy subject of o by sk−1 ∈ Sγk−2 − T . We know also, in this case, that s ∈ Sγk−2,
where s = sk. Therefore, we have the state-change γk−2  →ψ(s) γ′
k−1 which is the execution
of create subject of o by s. We have the desired state-change sequence of length k−1, and by
the induction hypothesis, the algorithm returns false.
– o  ∈ Sγk−2: in this case, if γk−2 = γ, then the algorithm does not return in lines 7-11, but
returns false in line 12, and we are done. Otherwise, we know that there exists a prior state,
γk−3. We have the following sub-sub-cases.
∗ s ∈ Sγk−2: in this case, consider the state-change γk−2  →ψ(s) γ′
k−1 which is the execution
of create subject of o by s. We have the desired state-change sequence of length k − 1,
and the algorithm returns false by the induction hypothesis.
∗ s  ∈ Sγk−2, s ∈ Sγk−3 and o ∈ Sγk−3: this cannot happen as we know that o  ∈ Sγk−2 and
s  ∈ Sγk−2, and we cannot create both o and s in a single state-change.
∗ s  ∈ Sγk−2, s  ∈ Sγk−3 and o ∈ Sγk−3: in this case, we know that the state-change
γk−3  →ψ(sk−2) γk−2 is the execution of destroy subject of oby sk−2. Weconsider, instead
the state-changes γk−3  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−2  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−1, where the ﬁrst state-change is the
execution of create subject of s by sk−2, and the second is the execution of transfer own
of o to s by sk−2. We have the desired state-change sequence of length k − 1, and the
algorithm returns false by the induction hypothesis.
∗ s  ∈ Sγk−2, s ∈ Sγk−3 and o  ∈ Sγk−3: in this case, consider the state-change γk−3  →ψ(s)
γ′
k−2 which is the execution of create subject of o by s. We have the desired state-change
sequence of length k − 2, and the algorithm returns false by the induction hypothesis.
∗ s  ∈ Sγk−2, s  ∈ Sγk−3 and o  ∈ Sγk−3: in this case, we know that sk−2 ∈ Sγk−3 − T .
Consider the following state-changes: γk−3  →ψ(sk−2) γ′
k−2  →ψ(s) γ′
k−1, where the ﬁrst
state-change istheexecution of create subjectofsby sk−2,and the second istheexecution
of create subject of o by s. We have the desired state-change sequence of length k − 1,
and the algorithm returns false by the induction hypothesis.
destroy subject – in this case, we know that x = own, s = sk, s  = o (as in state γk, s has the own right over
o), own ∈ Mγk−1[b s,o] for some b s ∈ Sγk−1 with b s  = s, and own ∈ Mγk−1[s,b s]. The state-change is the
execution of destroy subject of b s by s to aquire own over o. Let b ω =  b s,o,own , and b e be the execution
of the algorithm for the input (γ, b ω,T ). Then we know that b e returns false, by the induction hypothesis.
We observe that b e cannot return either in line 10 or line 13, because when in b e, y  ∈ Rψ. Similarly, let
ωs =  s,b s,own , and es be the execution of the algorithm for the input (γ,ωs,T ). Then, we know that
es returns false by the induction hypothesis, but not in line 10 or line 13 (as in the case of es as well,
y  ∈ Rψ). Let e be the execution of the algorithm for the input (γ,ω,T ). We have the following cases
and sub-cases.
• b e returns in line 9: in this case, we know that es cannot return in line 12, because b s ∈ Oγ. Therefore,
we have the following two sub-cases.
– es returns in line 9: in this case, e does not return in lines 7-8, but may return false in line 9, in
which case we are done. Otherwise, e does not return in lines 10-13, but e returns false in line
16, because the conditions are satisﬁed: we have b s that owns o, and s ∈ Sγ − T that owns b s.
– es returns in line 16: in this case, e does not return in lines 7-8, but may return false in line 9,
in which case we are done. Otherwise, e does not return in lines 10-13. Finally, e returns false
in line 16, because the conditions are satisﬁed: we know that b s owns o in γ, and that we have a
sequence of subjects as needed in lines 14-16, the ﬁrst of which owns b s.
23• b e returns in line 12: in this case e does not return in lines 7-11, but returns false in line 12 (in
particular, we know that e does not return in line 11 because es either returns in line 9, which means
that s ∈ Sγ − T , or returns in either line 12 or 16, which means that ∃ s′ ∈ Sγ − T ).
• b e returns in line 16: in this case, e does not return in lines 7-8, but may return in line 9, in which
case we are done. Otherwise, e does not return in lines 10-13, but returns in line 16, because the
same conditions that cause b e to return in line 16 cause e to return in line 16 as well.
The “only if” part: weneed to show that if the system is safe with respect to ω and T , then isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ω,T )
returns true. We show, equivalently, that if isSafeGD(γ,ψ,ω,T ) returns false, then the system is not safe with
respect to ω and T . We do this by considering each case that the algorithm returns false, and showing (by
construction) that a sequence of state-changes γ  →ψ(s1) γ1  →ψ(s2)      →ψ(sn) γn such that x ∈ Mγn[s,o]
exists (each si ∈ Sγi−1 − T , and the si’s may not be distinct from one another). We have the following cases.
• The algorithm returns in line 9: in this case, we have a state-change sequence of length 0 (i.e., simply γ),
as we know that x ∈ Mγ[s,o].
• The algorithm returns in line 10: in this case, we again have a state-change sequence of length 0 (i.e.,
simply γ), as we know that if x ∈ Rb∩Rψ, then x∗ ∈ Mγ[s,o] (and possession of x∗ implies possession
of x), and if x ∈ R∗
b ∩ Rψ, then x ∈ Mγ[s,o]. There are no other cases that the algorithm returns in line
10.
• The algorithm returns in line 12: in this case, we know from the check on line 11 that ∃ s′ ∈ Sγ − T .
Therefore, if s  ∈ Sγ, we have the following state-change sequence: γ  →ψ(s′) γ1  →ψ(s′) γ2  →ψ(s′) γ3,
where the ﬁrst state-change is the execution of create subject of s by s′, the second state-change is the
execution of create object of o (if o ∈ O − S) or create subject of o (if o ∈ S) by s′, and the last
state-change is the execution of one of the following:
– transfer own, if o ∈ S and x = own
– grant own, if o ∈ O − S and x = own
– grant control, if o ∈ S and x = control
– grant r, if x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ
– grant r∗, if x ∈ R∗
b ∩ Rψ
If s ∈ Sγ, then we simply use the same sequence as above, but without the ﬁrst state-change (i.e.,
γ  →ψ(s′) γ2  →ψ(s′) γ3).
• The algorithm returns in line 13: in this case, we know that x  = own and x  = control. If s  ∈ Sγ,
our state-change sequence is γ  →ψ(b s) γ1  →ψ(b s) γ2, where the ﬁrst state-change is the execution of
create subject of s by b s, and the second state-change is the execution of transfer r of x to s over o if
x ∈ Rb ∩Rψ, or transfer r∗ to s over o if x ∈ R∗
b ∩Rψ. If s ∈ Sγ, then we have simply exclude the ﬁrst
state-change (creation of s) from our state-change sequence.
• The algorithm returns in line 16: Let σ = {s1,...,sn} be the set of subjects alluded to in line 16, and
let si ∈ σ be such that si ∈ Sγ − T , for some integer i such that 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We know that o ∈ Oγ. If
s  ∈ Sγ, then the ﬁrst state-change in our state-change sequence is the execution of create subject of s by
si. If s ∈ Sγ, we exclude this state-change.
We then have i − 1 executions of destroy subject of each subject sj such that j < i, so that if γ′ is the
state at the end of the i − 1 executions, we have own ∈ Mγ′[si,o]. Finally, we have the following cases.
24– o ∈ S and x = own: in this case, we have the execution of transfer own of o by si to s.
– o ∈ O − S and x = own: in this case, we have the execution of grant own of o by si to s.
– o ∈ S, x = control and ∃ s′ such that control ∈ Mγ′[s′,o]: in this case, we have two state-changes,
both initiated by si. We ﬁrst have the execution of delete r of the control right over o from s′, and
then the execution of grant control over o to s.
– o ∈ S, x = control and ∄ s′ such that control ∈ Mγ′[s′,o]: in this case, we have the execution of
grant control over o to s by si.
– x ∈ Rb ∩ Rψ: in this case we have the execution of grant r of x over o to s by si.
– x ∈ R∗
b ∩ Rψ: in this case we have the execution of grant r∗ of x over o to s by si.
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